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# Political market orientation and strategic party postures in Danish political parties

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## Abstract

**Purpose** – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the strategic postures and political market orientation profile of two Danish parties. Profile stability at the organisational level is used as a control variable.

**Design/methodology/approach** – The strategic political postures of two Danish parties are derived using a self-typing study. Based on configuration theory, ideal organisational profiles to implement these studies are juxtaposed with the actual political market orientation profile for each party, gained from two datasets analysed using Partial Least Squares. Member activity levels are used to control for organisational stability.

**Findings** – The self-typing study revealed that Party A was perceived to follow a relationship builder posture, and Party B a convinced ideologist posture. However, both market orientation profiles resembled the organisational structures of a convinced ideologist. Thus, Party A exhibits a mismatch between strategic orientation and implemented organisational profile, based on configuration theory. The results were generally stable across political activity levels.

**Research limitations/implications** – The investigation represents an intra-group analysis, i.e. it is concerned only with two parties in one political system; however, this reflects the oligopolistic character of the vast majority of electoral markets and thus, further research could compare results across political systems. A link with performance variables needs to be established to assess the extent to which the organisational alignment results in competitive advantages for a party.

**Practical implications** – Whilst there exists a general cohesiveness within parties regarding the overall strategic posture, political managers need to be aware of the subtle differences that can affect the market orientation of different groups within the party.

**Originality/value** – The study contributes to understanding the concept of market orientation in the political sphere. More specifically, it empirically links political market orientation as an issue of political marketing implementation on the one hand, and strategic postures of parties as a strategic issue on the other, following a configuration theory logic.

**Keywords** Political parties, Philosophy, Personal needs, Strategic management, Market orientation, Denmark

**Paper type** Research paper



## Introduction

Commercial market orientation has been researched extensively during the last 20 years. Different constructs have been developed and tested empirically, and market orientation has been linked to different aspects of commercial performance. While it is now widely accepted that firms need to orient themselves not just towards their customers but must take into account a multitude of stakeholders in the market, research on non-profit organisations has not taken up the concept of market orientation with the same enthusiasm and rigour. For example, only in the last years has the issue of market orientation permeated the area of politics, specifically regarding the question of what a political market orientation (PMO) consists of in the political environment. Different frameworks of political market orientation have been developed (e.g. O'Cass, 1996, 2001a, b; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, b; Ormrod, 2005, 2007). However, it remains unclear if and how the resulting organisational models fit with the strategic aims of political actors (Lees-Marshment, 2001a; Baines *et al.*, 2003; Ormrod and Henneberg, 2009). Understanding this relationship between organisational aspects of a PMO on the one hand and political marketing strategy on the other has been linked with the further development of research in political marketing by applying state-of-the-art concepts from commercial marketing theory in a political context (Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007a). This article addresses this challenge by applying a configuration theory logic to link existing concepts of political marketing and test them empirically in the context of Danish parties.

Political marketing and political management as a research focus has grown over the last decades (Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007b). With it an interest in issues around political strategy and PMO arose, starting with O'Cass (1996) and continuing with recent contributions (Lees-Marshment, 2001a, b, c; O'Cass, 2001a, b; Bannon and Mochrie, 2005; Coleman, 2007; Lederer *et al.*, 2005; Lees, 2005; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Ormrod, 2005, 2006, 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; Ormrod and Henneberg, n.d.; Ormrod *et al.*, 2007). However, the vast majority of work, to date, has been either conceptual or qualitative in nature. Furthermore, discussions of PMO have mainly focused on the organisational make-up of political organisations, e.g. the attitudes, processes, and behaviours of parties without taking into consideration the fit of these with the overall party strategy.

Therefore, this article aims to contribute to the growing PMO and political marketing strategy literature by using quantitative modelling on a large dataset gained from two Danish parties in order to understand deviations between the perceived organisational PMO profile and an "ideal" PMO profile which is derived from the overall strategic party posture (SPP) of the political organisation. As such, we follow a configuration theory logic by assuming that certain strategic postures are best implemented via a specific organisational configuration (Doty *et al.*, 1993). Additionally, we test whether the perceptions of the PMO profile are moderated by the characteristics of the party members, specifically their political activity level. Our contribution is therefore on the one hand a better understanding of the concept of market orientation in the political sphere, more specifically, in empirically linking political market orientation as an issue of political marketing implementation, and the strategic postures of parties as a strategic issue on the other.

Our article will progress as follows: first, the conceptual model of PMO will be presented, based on a discussion of a parsimonious selection of the commercial market

orientation literature, similar to O'Casey (1996). This will be followed by a brief discussion of the relevant strategic political postures. We derive four hypotheses, two regarding the fit between an ideal PMO based on the strategic orientation, and the actual PMO, and two regarding the stability of the PMO profile results across political activity levels. The results of a Partial Least Squares analysis will be presented and discussed. Finally, we will detail the implications and limitations of the study.

### Conceptual framework

#### *Political market orientation*

A political market orientation (PMO) exists when a party is attuned to the latent and explicit needs and wants of a broad range of stakeholders that are present in the political system (Ormrod, 2005, 2007). This understanding of PMO is developed primarily from the commercial market orientation literature (e.g. Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Kohli *et al.*, 1993; Slater and Narver, 1995, 1998; Harrison-Walker, 2001; Lafferty and Hult, 2001; Langerak, 2003; Deshpande and Farley, 2004), drawing on what can be termed the interdependence approach to understanding organisational behaviours and orientations (Gray *et al.*, 1998; Griffiths and Grover, 1998; Gainer and Padanyi, 2005; Hult *et al.*, 2005). This approach underlines that different and originally separate market orientation components, namely managerial behaviours on the one hand, and the organisational culture on the other hand, are both essential to enabling an organisation to exhibit market oriented characteristics. Thus, as part of the interdependence argument of market orientation, managerial behaviours alone will not suffice, as the organisation must also be attuned to market needs and wants via empathetic attitudes towards a wide-ranging set of exchange partners, and vice versa. Both together represent the organizational profile, which is chosen to implement a specific strategy (Doty *et al.*, 1993).

Based on these presuppositions, our conceptualisation of a PMO modifies an approach initially developed by Ormrod (2005, 2007) and empirically investigated by Ormrod and Henneberg (2006, 2008, 2009); Ormrod and Henneberg (n.d.), and Ormrod *et al.* (2007) to emphasise members' orientation towards the wider society. PMO is made up of four constructs[1] which represent party behaviours, and four constructs which represent party orientations towards four general stakeholder groups within society. The four constructs representing important party behaviours are:

- (1) Information Generation;
- (2) Information Dissemination;
- (3) Member Participation; and
- (4) Consistent Strategy Implementation.

These activities are arranged in a chain of antecedents and consequences, which represent the flow of information and knowledge through the organisation:

- Information Generation (IG) is developed from Kohli and Jaworski's (1990) intelligence generation construct and represents the process and activities of gaining information from relevant stakeholder groups (i.e. direct and indirect exchange partners) using both formal and informal channels (e.g. market research or social interactions). In extension to the commercial conceptualisation,

the Information Generation construct is broadened to explicitly emphasise the ability of all members of the organisation to both encourage and exhibit this behaviour rather than it being the sole responsibility of political managers (Shapiro, 1988; Narver and Slater, 1990; Harrison-Walker, 2001; Gounaris, 2008). Kohli *et al.* (1993) emphasise the fact that each department in commercial organisations has its own “take” on specific market situations; in a PMO context this is analogous to all members having their own, unique set of stakeholder contacts from which information can be generated (Ormrod, 2005).

- Information Dissemination (ID) This construct is again developed from Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) work and describes behaviours of disseminating market information throughout the organisation to those who need it in their work for the party, i.e. it covers both organisational transmission and reception of information (Ormrod, 2005). Information Dissemination activities are, as with Information Generation activities, the responsibility of all members of the political organisation (Shapiro, 1988; Narver and Slater, 1990; Harrison-Walker, 2001; Gounaris, 2008). It must also be noted that even though party members are not in a position to generate nuanced information from the various stakeholder groups, the important issue is the extent to which the generated information is received and passed on (Ormrod, 2005).
- Member Participation (MP) represents the use of market information through member involvement in party strategy and tactics development. This comprises activities of organisational planning, i.e. gaining action-oriented insights from the market information (Daft and Weick, 1984; Harrison-Walker, 2001). As such it is the internal phase of Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) Taking Action construct, where the information that has been generated and disseminated is made sense of, and discussed within the organisation. A separate Member Participation construct is also argued by Bille (2003) to be necessary to the conceptualisation of a PMO, as party members act as legitimisers of their party’s existence within the democratic context.
- Finally, Consistent Strategy Implementation (CSI) relates to the activities involved in carrying out the agreed-upon strategic plans with which to attain organisational aims (Ormrod, 2007). It is closely based upon the taking-action construct in Kohli and Jaworski (1990), which is common to the vast majority of commercial market orientation conceptualisations (Lafferty and Hult, 2001). In the context of highly market oriented political organisations it is imperative that as many members as possible are aware of the collective decision as even inactive members can act as sources of information towards, for example, voters (Lees-Marshment, 2001a).
- Another element of the organisational make-up as part of a PMO are the cultural orientations within the organisation which can help or hinder the enactment of different behavioural aspects of PMO. Four constructs represent party orientations towards stakeholder groups in the political marketing and society: Voter Orientation, Competitor Orientation, Internal Orientation and Societal Orientation. Each of the four is grounded in the relationships that can be initiated, developed, maintained or severed with each of the stakeholder groups

as a result of the strategic posture that is followed, i.e. the extent to which relationships exist with each group rather than the type of relationships.

- Voter Orientation (VO). An orientation towards the customer is at the core of market orientation research and was present in all approaches surveyed by Lafferty and Hult (2001). In the political marketing literature focusing on electioneering, the political customer is widely considered to be analogous to the voter (Henneberg, 2002). Thus, the Voter Orientation construct has been developed directly from the commercial market orientation literature (Narver and Slater, 1990) and is the equivalent of a customer orientation, i.e. it focuses on attitudes towards understanding the needs and wants of direct (electoral) exchange partners (Henneberg, 2002).
- Competitor Orientation (CO) has been developed from Narver and Slater (1990) to take into account the necessity of being aware of the actions of competing parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001a; Ormrod, 2005). In addition to this, being oriented towards competitors in a political context includes entertaining the possibility of cooperating with other political parties (Lock and Harris, 1996); i.e. attitudes regarding differentiating from other competitors as well as collaboration, which some electoral systems based on majority voting procedures make necessary, e.g. in the form of governmental coalition formations (Bowler and Farrell, 1992).
- The third construct, Internal Orientation (IO), is a context-specific adaptation of Narver and Slater's (1990) inter-functional coordination. While commercial market orientation generally focuses on the organisational ability to utilise information in a different functional division to that in which it was generated (Lafferty and Hult, 2001), as part of a PMO an Internal Orientation refers to party members becoming an integral part of decision-making mechanisms to legitimise party activities (Bille, 2003; Ormrod, 2005). Thus, a vertical dimension complementary to the commercial market orientation conceptualisation of Narver and Slater (1990) is necessary due to the more hierarchical organisational structure of many political parties (Dean and Croft, 2001).
- Societal Orientation (SO) is designed to capture the more general orientation of the party towards stakeholder groups in the political system that can influence parties at the micro- (citizens in general, e.g. Heidar and Saglie, 2003) meso- (lobby and interest groups, e.g. Andrews, 1996; Newman, 2005) and macro-levels (media, e.g. Dean and Croft, 2001; Róka, 1999). The Societal Orientation construct has no equivalent in the commercial market orientation literature, as the environment is usually conceptualised as mediating or moderating the ability to effectuate a market orientation (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990). It does, however, feature in Dean and Croft's (2001) discussion of Christopher *et al.*'s (1991) Six Markets Model and its applicability for political "markets".

These constructs will be used below to operationalise the relationships between different aspects of PMO *vis-à-vis* each other, i.e. by identifying organisational forms such as PMO profiles.

### *Strategic political postures*

Strategic postures are adopted by organisations as part of their decisions about how to relate to the competitive environment. As such, strategic postures are one element of the overarching competitive position, that is, how an organisation intends to compete (Aaker, 2001; Hooley *et al.*, 2001). The competitive position consists of a specific configuration of resources, competences, and goals *vis-a-vis* the environmental situation (Hooley *et al.*, 1998; Porter, 1985). For example, an organisation can choose to develop a customer offering after exhaustive market research of explicit needs, that is, it can follow the market (Davis and Manrodt, 1996). However, it can also nurture, uncover and fulfill latent needs, that is, lead the market (Hellensen, 2003; McDonald and Wilson, 2002), or an organisation can balance both approaches when developing a relational strategy (Slater and Narver, 1999).

Using the two dimensions of leading and/or following as elements of a strategic postures, the focus of political organisations can be conceptualised. In the political context, leading the market emphasises the prerogative of the party's offering (i.e. its ideology and convictions), with political marketing activities being directed towards attaining aims derived from these convictions, a Convinced Ideologist[2] posture. This means influencing and convincing different stakeholder groups about the value of the party's offering. Following the market, on the other hand, entails reacting to events such as public opinion changes within the political system by developing adaptive offerings that fulfill stakeholder needs and wants (Henneberg, 2006a), i.e. it exemplifies a Tactical Populist posture. Balancing the leading and following elements results in a Relationship Builder posture, whilst a lack of both elements is characterised as a Political Lightweight posture (the two postures that are relevant to our investigation, the Relationship Builder and Convinced Ideologist, are discussed in depth below). The specific emphasis on leading or following in politics represent a competitive dynamic in the sense that a party can gravitate to different postures over time (Henneberg, 2006b).

Following the configuration theory framework, it can be argued that different PMO profiles, i.e. varying emphasis on certain attitudes and behaviours, are more appropriate for different strategic orientations of a political organisation (Narver *et al.*, 1998; Slater and Narver, 1999). Based on Mintzberg's (1979, 1983) as well as Miles and Snow's (1978) configurational theories, each strategic posture can be successful in a given market environment. However, based on the chosen posture, a specific organisational configuration needs to be implemented, which underpins (and enables) the strategic orientation (Walker and Ruekert, 1987; Doty *et al.*, 1993; Ketchen *et al.*, 1997; Ruekert *et al.*, 1985; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). Thus, while the choice of strategy type is "free", that of the organizational implementation profile is dependent. Specific ideal organizational profiles for each strategic type or posture can be derived (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Doty *et al.*, 1993), and the fit between the strategy type and the implemented profile is posited to be related to the extent to which an organization is successful (Ketchen *et al.*, 1993; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003).

### **Hypotheses development**

Based on Ormrod and Henneberg (2007), different ideal PMO profiles for each of the strategic postures of political parties can be derived. In the context of this study, both Danish parties that agreed to participate in the empirical investigation (Party A and

Party B) are relatively small, with memberships below 10,000 and with a total combined share of almost 20 per cent of the popular vote at the time of this study. An understanding of their specific political posture was derived via a self-typing paragraph method as part of this study (see below). While one of our focal parties (Party A) exhibits the characteristics of a Relationship Builder (i.e. it shows high levels of “following” as well as “leading”), the other (Party B) is indicated as being a Convinced Ideologist, i.e. a party which is predominantly aiming towards a “leading” strategy. In the following, only the ideal PMO profiles for these two relevant postures are discussed.

#### *Ideal PMO profiles by postures*


The Relationship Builder party (Party A) places an explicit emphasis on acknowledging both the importance and opinions of all societal stakeholder groups (Henneberg, 2006a). This said, there will always be some form of actual trade-off with regard to the extent to which the opinions of each group affect the offering, as it is rarely possible to implement “*Texan taxes with Scandinavian welfare benefits*” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2007a, p. 20). Driving the market (leading) by attempting to convince stakeholders of the utility of the party offering, and being driven by the market (following) by tailoring the party offering to specific stakeholder needs and wants, are not necessarily an incommensurable proposition (Connor, 1999; Henneberg, 2006a; Slater and Narver, 1999). Relationship building parties such as Heidar and Saglie’s (2003) network party-type put strong strategic emphasis on both dimensions of leading as well as following, and try to find organizational ways to integrate and balance both aspects.

Based on this strategic posture, a PMO profile can be derived (following Ormrod and Henneberg, 2007) in which all eight constructs of PMO are somewhat important. Furthermore, the paths from each of the attitudinal constructs to the behavioural constructs, and also between the four behavioural constructs, are expected to be strong and significant. As such, this SPP provides the most saturated path model in which the other ideal PMO profiles are nested. Building on the argument that leading and following are not mutually exclusive (Narver *et al.*, 2004), the focus of the Relationship Builder party is such that when emphasis is placed on uncovering the opinions of any of the stakeholder groups, this will have a positive impact on the generation of information and its dissemination throughout the organisation, which in turn informs the internal debate and increases the consistency of the implementation of the agreed-upon strategy. The ideal PMO profile for the strategic posture of a Relationship Builder is summarised in Figure 1.

The first hypothesis is therefore:

*H1.* Party A will exhibit a political market orientation profile in line with the ideal profile of a Relationship Builder strategic party posture.

For a Convinced Ideologist (Party B) internal stakeholders play a crucially important role in guiding this type of strategic posture (Henneberg, 2006a), as they are the “carriers” of the ideology and convictions of the party (Lees-Marshment, 2001a; Lilleker, 2005). As such, a party that adopts this strategic posture aims to drive the market (a leading approach), as it believes its offering, conviction, or ideology to be intrinsically superior to that of its competitors. Convinced Ideologists are therefore



**Note:** Important constructs and significant relationships are in bold, unimportant/non-significant ones are in grey


**Figure 1.**  
The ideal PMO profile of a Relationship Builder and Convinced Ideologist SPP (Relationship Builder)

strong on aspects concerned with leading while following characteristics are strategically less important. It is therefore suggested that the Internal Orientation will be highly developed in the ideal PMO profile for this strategic orientation, and that it will impact more than any other attitudinal construct on all the behavioural aspects (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2007). Furthermore, some selected, party-specific stakeholder groups within society with a particular affinity with the party (as represented in the Societal Orientation) will also feature dominantly in the organisational PMO make-up of these parties. Such affiliated external organisations can have a shared history or are based on a natural dovetailing of core beliefs, for example, socialist parties and trade unions (e.g. Leopold, 1997), or green parties and environmental movements (e.g. Cordier, 1996). However, the majority of stakeholders outside of the party, including voters, are only important as passive recipients of communication and influencing efforts by the party. Thus, Voter and Competitor Orientation are hypothesised to be less developed and of minor influence on behavioural aspects of the party's PMO. However, the behavioural chain is expected to be strong, with especially the construct of Member Participation being an important driver of Consistent Strategy Implementation. Figure 2 summarises the ideal PMO profile for the strategic posture of a Convinced Ideologist.

The second hypothesis for our investigation states:

*H2.* Party B will exhibit a political market orientation profile in line with the ideal profile of a Convinced Ideologist strategic party posture.





**Figure 2.**  
The ideal PMO profile of a  
Relationship Builder and  
Convinced Ideologist SPP  
(Convinced Ideologist)

**Note:** Important constructs and significant relationships are in bold, unimportant/  
non-significant ones are in grey

*PMO profiles and political activity levels*

Because PMO represents an organisational characteristic, the commercial marketing literature underlines the importance of all employees having a responsibility to exhibit market oriented characteristics (e.g. Shapiro, 1988; Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990; Harrison-Walker, 2001; Gounaris, 2008). By extension, in order for the organisation to be market oriented, all employees have to be knowledgeable of, and agree on, the general thrust of the organisational strategy (Daft and Weick, 1984; Harrison-Walker, 2001). In both the political marketing (e.g. Granik, 2005; Lilleker, 2005), and PMO literature (e.g. O’Cass, 1996, 2001a, b; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, b; Ormrod, 2005, 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg, 2007, 2008), the contribution of rank-and-file party members (i.e. those volunteer members who are not elected politicians or employed by the party) is considered essential as they can function as credible proponents of the party offering. This can be done through, for example, their social interactions with different stakeholders. This view is backed by a political science perspective: parties fulfil the role of facilitating the participation of citizens in the legislative process and of aggregating and articulating the opinions of the populace via their memberships (Bille, 2003). Parties exist, therefore, as vehicles that enable a particular constellation of political and societal beliefs and opinions to be explicated. While there may be disagreements on the details of policy, the fundamental approach to the direction of society is one that it shared by all party members, implying that a

large degree of organisational cohesiveness is necessary to justify the existence and stability of the party.

The importance of organisational cohesiveness underlined in the commercial and political marketing literature together with the political science literature leads to a need to control for the impact of party member differences. As part of this study, we therefore focus on PMO profiles perceptions by different groups within the party, i.e. the stability of the organisational make-up. As discussed above, in the political marketing and political science literature, no such differences are assumed to be prevalent. Therefore, our hypotheses are:

- H3a* There are no significant differences in the perceptions of the PMO profile between the different members of Party A.
- H3b* There are no significant differences in the perceptions of the PMO profile between the different members of Party B.

### Data and variable construction

#### *Self-typing study*

Initially, the strategic postures of the two relevant Danish parties were assessed. This was carried out using a self-typing paragraph method, in line with configuration studies (e.g. James and Hattan, 1995; Shortell and Zajac, 1990; Snow and Hambrick, 1980). We derived three self-typing descriptions for the main political posture types from the existing literature. The initial wording was based on Henneberg (2006a) and then subjected to several rounds of pre-tests with political experts, with a simultaneous development of the wording in both English- and Danish-language versions. We adjusted the descriptions of several of the postures according to our pre-test results, and eliminated one non-viable posture (in line with self-typing studies in the commercial sphere; James and Hattan, 1995). A second pre-test resulted in further slight changes to the description. The final English wording of the descriptions can be found in Appendix 1.

We sent these descriptions via e-mail to seven experts with an academic interest in the Danish party system. We requested them to assign to each of the eight main Danish political parties the strategic posture which best describes the party's orientation in the political competition during the last electoral cycle. Due to the smaller number of respondents compared to studies in the commercial literature (e.g. Snow and Hambrick, 1980; Shortell and Zajac, 1990; James and Hattan, 1995), a qualitative method of assessing criterion validity was used. Cooper and Schindler (2001) provide four characteristics which, when met, suggest adequate levels of criterion validity in qualitative research: availability of information to the respondents on the choice criteria for categorisation; freedom from bias; relevance; and interrater reliability. The first two characteristics were met by using experts with an academic interest in Danish politics; all eight parties represented in the Danish parliament were included in the self-typing study in order to maintain the anonymity of the two parties relevant for our study. The criterion of relevance is dependent on adequately describing the multiple facets of each SPP. This was ensured via several rounds of pre-testing of the self-typing paragraphs. Finally, for the calculation of interrater reliability for nominal data with multiple coders we used Krippendorff's  $\alpha$  (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007) which is considered to be a conservative measure of interrater reliability (Lombard

*et al.*, 2002). The acceptable cut-off point of 0.70 in exploratory studies (Lombard *et al.*, 2002) was attained with an interrater reliability of  $\alpha = 0.73$ . Our results showing that Party A and B are characterised by a Relationship Builder and Convinced Ideologist posture, respectively, are therefore assumed to be reliable.

#### *PMO model study*

The PMO model is operationalised in a similar way to similar studies in the commercial (Schlosser and McNaughton, 2007) and political (O’Cass, 2001a; Ormrod and Henneberg, n.d.) market orientation literature (for a list of items see Table I). Multiple respondents within each organisation are used to understand the relationships extant in the nomological model of constructs. We follow closely Ormrod and Henneberg’s (2008), Ormrod and Henneberg (n.d.) operationalisation of PMO using the member perceptions of party market orientation as a proxy for the single, expert respondent common in commercial studies (Langerak, 2003). In addition to the items administered as part of the investigation of the PMO model, a self-categorisation question asked members about their activity level within the party. This helped operationalising our control variable of member groups in order to investigate *H3a* and *H3b*. The five choice categories ranged from 1: “very active, I am involved with the party at least once a week”, to 5: “Not at all active, I am involved with the party at most once or twice a year”. These categories are collapsed into three categories, the “very active members” (i.e. attending party meetings more than once a month), the “moderately active members” (i.e. attending party meetings but not necessarily on a regular basis) and the “inactive members”.

*Pre-test and sample.* The development of the questionnaire was carried out in English (due to the reliance on existing scales for the PMO constructs) and translated into Danish using a standard double-blind translation procedure. The translated questionnaire was subjected to a further round of pre-testing with ten politically active students at a major Danish University. There were no problems encountered with the understanding of the translated items. The questionnaire was administered online using the websurveyor software, with an invitation from the researchers to participate being sent out to all party members by the parties in a covering e-mail. The research was conducted in the autumn of 2006. In Party A, 7,500 e-mails were sent with a total response rate of  $n = 1,560$  (split of  $n = 482$  very active members,  $n = 395$  moderately active members, and  $n = 683$  inactive members; i.e. 31 per cent/25 per cent/44 per cent of respondents). In Party B, 9,500 e-mails were sent with a total response rate of  $n = 1,623$  (split of  $n = 380$  very active members,  $n = 481$  moderately active members, and  $n = 762$  inactive members; i.e. 23 per cent/30 per cent/47 per cent of respondents). As neither party allowed a reminder mailing, we tested for significant differences in means between the fastest and slowest thirds of respondents ( $p < 0.05$ ) as recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977), which did not reveal any non-response problems.

#### *Variable operationalisation*

A total of 51 items were operationalised using a seven-point, Likert-type scale and followed Ormrod and Henneberg (2008) and Ormrod and Henneberg (n.d.) in operationalising the constructs in reflective measurement models (Bagozzi and Baumgartner, 1994; Diamantopoulos and Sigauw, 2006; Diamantopoulos and

Construct quality criteria and item wordings	Item reliabilities	
	Party A	Party B
<i>Internal Orientation (IO)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.56, CR = 0.79		
Party B: AVE = 0.54, CR = 0.78		
The influence of each Party member reflects their position in the Party hierarchy (R)	0.71	0.68
Politicians have the most influence in Party policy development (R)	0.73	0.72
All members have an equal influence in fundamental Party decisions	0.80	0.80
<i>Voter Orientation (VO)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.67, CR = 0.86		
Party B: AVE = 0.69, CR = 0.87		
A trade-off is made between the opinions of the electorate on the one hand, and the Party's ideology on the other	0.83	0.80
In general, the opinions of potential voters affect the extent to which the Party is guided by its ideology	0.89	0.90
The opinion of the electorate affects the direction of the Party in most cases	0.73	0.79
<i>Competitor Orientation (CO)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.57, CR = 0.72		
Party B: AVE = 0.57, CR = 0.72		
The Party takes all other parties into consideration as competitors for votes and resources, irrespective of their ideology	0.65	0.86
The opinions of other parties are important to the Party when making decisions regarding policy and strategy	0.84	0.63
<i>Societal Orientation (SO)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.59, CR = 0.74		
Party B: AVE = 0.60, CR = 0.75		
Most local level issues are not seen as important in the Party (R)	0.66	0.72
Individuals active at the local level are able to influence Party policy, irrespective of whether these individuals are Party members or not	0.84	0.82
<i>Information Generation (IG)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.57, CR = 0.80, $Q^2 = 0.09$ , $R^2 = 0.17$		
Party B: AVE = 0.55, CR = 0.78, $Q^2 = 0.08$ , $R^2 = 0.15$		
The Party makes a point of finding out what members think	0.85	0.86
Information is gathered from interest groups regarding their specific opinions	0.74	0.67
Party members gather useful information from those they meet	0.67	0.69
<i>Information Dissemination (ID)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.59, CR = 0.85, $Q^2 = 0.26$ , $R^2 = 0.45$		
Party B: AVE = 0.58, CR = 0.85, $Q^2 = 0.21$ , $R^2 = 0.36$		
The organizational structure of the Party means that the voice of every Party member can be heard	0.78	0.75
Elected Party members keep rank-and-file members informed about their work	0.81	0.80
The party leadership (e.g. elected politicians, Party professionals and active volunteer members) rarely listen to rank-and-file Party members (R)	0.78	0.81
All Party members pass on any information that could help other members in their work for the Party	0.69	0.68

(continued)

**Table I.**  
Construct average variance extracted (AVE), composite reliabilities (CR),  $Q^2$ , and  $R^2$ ; item loadings

Construct quality criteria and item wordings	Item reliabilities	
	Party A	Party B
<i>Member Participation (MP)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.59, CR = 0.85, $Q^2 = 0.28$ , $R^2 = 0.48$		
Party B: AVE = 0.54, CR = 0.82, $Q^2 = 0.21$ , $R^2 = 0.39$		
Party members directly contribute to strategy development	0.80	0.77
Most changes to Party strategy are discussed extensively before the final decision is made	0.72	0.63
All Party members are consulted before any decision is made regarding Party policy	0.72	0.66
All Party members have a real influence in strategy development	0.84	0.85
<i>Consistent Strategy Implementation (CSI)</i>		
Party A: AVE = 0.53, CR = 0.82, $Q^2 = 0.18$ , $R^2 = 0.37$		
Party B: AVE = 0.52, CR = 0.81, $Q^2 = 0.13$ , $R^2 = 0.28$		
Party members play an active role in implementing Party strategy	0.66	0.67
No matter who is asked in the Party, all members provide a consistent picture of the Party's policies	0.75	0.68
Party strategy is known by all members	0.82	0.79
Inactive members provide a picture of the Party's policies that is consistent with that provided by active members	0.68	0.73

Table I.

Note: (R) indicates a reversed scale

Winkelhofer, 2001; Jarvis *et al.*, 2003). An inspection of the descriptive statistics led to the deletion of one item from each of the two data sets (the same item) due to cut-off levels for skewness and kurtosis above those recommended by Hair *et al.* (2003), and a further Principle Components Analysis with Varimax rotation removed a further item from each dataset.

## Results

### *Model evaluation*

The Partial Least Squares (PLS) method of estimating path coefficients was used to understand the relationships between latent constructs. PLS was chosen due to model complexity and the exploratory nature of the investigation (Wold, 1982; Bagozzi and Yi, 1994; Fornell and Cha, 1994; Chin, 1998). Hulland (1999) suggests a two-stage process for evaluating PLS models: first, the adequacy of the measurement model is assessed using the individual item reliabilities (factor loadings), then the nomological network using indices for convergent validity, discriminant validity and predictive relevance. Two models (one for each party) were tested using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle *et al.*, 2007), one for each party.


Items were eliminated using an iterative process until the various diagnostics demonstrated that the constructs were adequately explained. In both models, the vast majority of individual item reliabilities exceeded the 0.70 threshold recommended by Hulland (1999) (Table I). Convergent validity can be assessed using the average variance extracted (AVE) and Composite reliability (CR) scores. In order for more than half of the variance of a construct to be explained, the AVE score must be greater than 0.50, which was the case for all constructs. CR is related to the more widely known

Cronbach's  $\alpha$  statistic but has the advantage of allowing a degree of heterogeneity between items, with the recommended minimum value being 0.70. All constructs demonstrated CR statistics greater than the recommended minimum value, demonstrating that both models possess good levels of convergent validity.

In order for items to explain more of the variance of their constructs, the AVE scores for any two constructs should be higher than their squared correlation (see Appendix 2). This is the case in both models, and thus the discriminant validity criteria are met. Finally, the Stone-Geisser  $Q^2$  statistics (Geisser, 1975; Stone, 1974) for assessing the predictive relevance of each latent construct were all positive, indicating that both models possess good predictive relevance.


In assessing the nomological model, it was found that the PMO path coefficients for the four behavioural constructs were all strong and significant for Party A (Figure 3) as well as for Party B (Figure 4), ranging from 0.43 (IG  $\rightarrow$  ID in Party B) to 0.55 (ID  $\rightarrow$  MP in Party A). This is expected with regard to the ideal PMO profiles for both Party A and B. The patterns mirrors results reported by Ormrod and Henneberg (n.d.), despite the different party sizes and political system in our study. The path coefficients were generally higher for Party A, as were both the  $Q^2$  and  $R^2$  statistics.

The attitudinal constructs of PMO for Party A exhibit low or insignificant path coefficients for the impact of Voter and Competitor Orientation on the behavioural constructs. This is not in line with the expected ideal PMO profile for Party A as a Relationship Builder. For Party A only the perceptions of the Internal Orientation and



**Note:** Important constructs and significant relationships are in bold, unimportant/non-significant ones are in grey

**Figure 3.**  
Path coefficients of Party A



**Figure 4.**  
Path coefficients for  
Party B

**Note:** Important constructs and significant relationships are in bold, unimportant/non-significant ones are in grey

Societal Orientation constructs had significant, positive relationships to the four behavioural constructs, consistent with a Convinced Ideologist posture. Thus, *H1* is not supported.

Party B was typed as a Convinced Ideologist, and as can be seen in Figure 4, its PMO profile was in line with the expectations of the ideal PMO profile for such a strategic posture. Whilst the path coefficients did not display values as high as those in Party A, all paths from the Internal Orientation and Societal Orientation constructs to the behavioural constructs significant. In addition to this, three of the four path coefficients from the Voter Orientation construct were also significant, although two were negative. This indicates that whilst there is a relationship between the Voter Orientation and behavioural constructs, an increase in the focus on voters is related to a decrease in the overall level of behavioural market orientation of Party B. There were no significant relationships between the Competitor Orientation and the different behavioural constructs of PMO, in line with expectations of the ideal profile for a Convinced Ideologist party. Thus, *H2* is supported.

*Comparison of structural model path coefficients by activity level*

To investigate hypotheses *H3a* and *H3b* two steps were followed: Initially, PLS models of the PMO profiles were calculated for each party member group. The three activity levels described above were used as categorisation criteria for the groups:

- *group 1*: very active members;
- *group 2*: moderately active members; and
- *group 3*: inactive members.

The pattern of PMO profiles matching the profile associated with the Convinced Ideologist SPP continued for each of the three activity levels in both parties. The behavioural chain in each of the six models exhibited statistically significant, strong path coefficients, ranging from 0.38 to 0.63. With regard to the path coefficients linking the four attitudinal constructs to PMO behaviour, those from the Internal Orientation and Societal Orientation constructs were generally significant whilst those from the Competitor Orientation and Voter Orientation constructs were mainly insignificant, again mirroring the overall results for the parties. This indicates initially support for *H3a* and *H3b*.

However, a second step is necessary, using significance tests, to assess the differences in path coefficients for each of the three activity levels within the two parties (see Appendix 3 for the path coefficients for all sub-sample models; Appendix 4 for sub-sample model quality criteria; and Appendix 5 for comparing sub-sample AVE scores with the squared construct correlations). Differences for the relationships between the constructs provides a second indicator regarding *H3a* and *H3b*, i.e. that party members exhibit an homogenous perception of the inter-construct relationships, that is, the organisational cohesiveness of each party regarding political marketing orientation. The *t*-statistics for each comparison can be seen in Table II.

In Party A most path coefficients were different at the  $p < 0.01$  significance level, including all comparisons between the three groups regarding the behavioural chain of PMO activities. Thus, *H3a* is only partially supported: while different activity level groups within the party similarly perceive the organisational profile to resemble that of a Convinced Ideologist, group differences exist in the weights and path coefficients which link the different constructs of this PMO profile. The same pattern is visible for Party B: while two path coefficients are significantly different at the  $p < 0.05$  level, the majority are different at the  $p < 0.01$  level, again only partially supporting *H3b* and indicating a potential instability in the perceptions of the PMO profile.

Path	Intra-party comparison (Party A)			Intra-party comparison (Party B)		
	Groups 1 ↔ 2	Groups 1 ↔ 3	Groups 2 ↔ 3	Groups 1 ↔ 2	Groups 1 ↔ 3	Groups 2 ↔ 3
IO → IG	4.27**	10.69**	5.13**	5.44**	2.03*	9.23**
IO → ID	(0.30)	3.97**	3.36**	(0.67)	(0.16)	(1.00)
IO → MP	4.38**	4.03**	(1.06)	4.12**	7.64**	3.05**
IO → CSI	(0.64)	(1.35)	(0.56)	4.10**	2.73**	8.31**
SO → IG	13.43**	5.75**	10.19**	6.18**	11.16**	4.71**
SO → ID	2.23*	4.67**	6.89**	3.14**	4.54**	8.83**
SO → MP	(0.52)	(1.12)	(1.61)	–	–	2.84**
VO → ID	(1.43)	–	–	(1.17)	(0.24)	(1.75)
IG → ID	4.79**	8.00**	12.51**	6.98**	9.44**	(1.51)
ID → MP	7.27**	4.95**	12.23**	8.40**	12.14**	2.54*
MP → CSI	5.54**	4.68**	10.67**	(1.70)	5.48**	3.97**

Notes: \* =  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* =  $p < 0.01$ . Insignificant differences in parantheses. “–” indicates where a comparison was not possible due to one of the path coefficients being insignificant

**Table II.**  
T-statistics for differences between groups



## Discussion

This study investigated the fit of the political market orientation profiles of two Danish parties with the expected (ideal) organisational profile based on the party's strategic orientation. The results of this study provide important insights for party managers. Using a self-typing study, Party A was assessed to exhibit a Relationship Builder posture, while Party B exhibit characteristics of a Convinced Ideologist, i.e. its strategy was dominated by a leading mentality. Based on these strategic orientations, ideal PMO profile were compared with the actual one, based on perceptions by party members. For Party A a mismatch existed between the expected ideal PMO profile and the actual one which resembled the path model assumed to be in line with a Convinced Ideologist orientation, and not the Relationship Builder orientation of Party A. Especially organisational aspects regarding Voter and Competitor Orientation are underdeveloped to achieve a better fit with party strategy.

Party B on the other hand shows the expected PMO profiles, i.e. a fit between expected and actual organisational implementation of the strategical orientation exists. Finally, controlling for the stability of these results by investigating the intra-party differences by party member activity levels indicates that the perceptions of their party's overall PMO profile generally overlap between groups, but that the specific relationships between the attitudes and the behavioural aspects of PMO are perceived significantly different between groups. This indicates that whilst there exists a general cohesiveness within parties as expected in the political science literature regarding the overall strategic posture, political managers need to be aware of the subtle differences that can affect the PMO perceptions of different groups within the party.

A surprising result is that despite contextual differences between the parties, such as number of members, position on the left-right ideological spectrum, and the strategic posture, the analysis of PMO profiles showed that many societal groups as well as voters and competitors displayed only a very small importance and impact on the market orientation. This finding is in line with previous research on PMO of British and German parties (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2006, 2009; Ormrod and Henneberg, n.d.).

## Conclusions, limitations and future research

Based on a configuration theory logic, the fit of the actual organisational make-up (in our study operationalised as the PMO profile) with a theoretically derived ideal profile linked to the chosen strategic orientation of the party, indicates the coherence between strategic aspects of a political party and the implementation of that strategy. As such, this study demonstrates the ability of concepts developed from the commercial marketing literature to contribute to research in the political sphere (Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007a). As such, we contribute to the understanding of the interplay of political market orientation as an issue of political marketing implementation on the one hand, and strategic postures of parties as a strategic issue on the other.

However, in order to assess the extent to which the organisational alignment results in competitive advantages for a party, a link with performance variables needs to be established (Powell, 1992; Slater and Olson, 2000; Venkatraman, 1990). Further studies, therefore, need to investigate this link, e.g. using a profile derivation method that has become established in the strategic marketing and strategy literature (Ruekert and Walker, 1987; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003; Kabadayi *et al.*, 2007). Based on the results of our study, it can be hypothesised that Party A performs worse compared to Party B

due to the fact that Party A shows a misalignment of strategic implementation *vis-à-vis* its party strategy.

Implicit within the configuration theory logic is the assumption that “structure follows strategy”, i.e. there exists a uni-directional relationship between strategic orientation on the one hand, and organisational implementation issues on the other (Chandler, 1962; Miller, 1986). It needs to be acknowledged that there exists considerable debate in the strategic management literature about this issue, with several authors arguing that organisational dimensions affect competitive strategies (i.e. via impacting on the strategy formulation process) (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Galan and Sanchez-Bueno, 2009). Thus, there may be feedback interactions between structure and strategy happening within organisations that are only insufficiently conceptualised in our model of PMO. Further research, i.e. qualitative research on the strategy formulation and implementation process of political parties, is therefore needed (Baines *et al.*, 2002).

Further research also needs to compare results across political systems to control for the impact of, for example, the electoral system. This is especially relevant given the focus of the current investigation on two parties in one political system, i.e. the research mainly uses intra-group analyses. While this reflects the oligopolistic character of all electoral markets and as such can be considered to be a universal characteristic rather than a limitation *per se*, further research needs to corroborate the findings via inter-group analyses. Finally, the investigation was carried out during the mid-term period; future research could investigate the temporal effects posited by Ormrod and Henneberg (2006, 2009) in order to better understand the relationship between position on the electoral cycle and the importance of different external and internal stakeholders to the parties. For example, the lack of Voter and Competitor Orientation in the PMO profiles for Parties A and B may be due to the fact that at the time of our study, no election campaign was prevalent.

### Notes

1. Constructs are capitalised in the text to increase the readability.
2. As with Henneberg (2006a), and Ormrod and Henneberg (2007), the terms “ideologist” and “populist” are labels and do not represent judgements on the part of the authors.

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**Appendix 1**

*Wording of the three self-typing paragraphs*

Party type 1 = convinced ideologist, type 2 = tactical populist and type 3 = relationship builder.

*Party type 1.* When this party develops policy, it considers core party beliefs to be generally more important than rigidly following public opinion. On the whole, the party emphasizes policy consistency, even if this sometimes goes against public opinion. This party attempts to include as many members as possible in the policy development process. Marketing tasks mainly consist of selling party policy.

*Party type 2.* When this party develops policy, it considers public opinion to be generally more important than rigidly following core party beliefs. On the whole, the party emphasizes policy flexibility when responding to public opinion. This party includes professional advisers and market research consultants in the internal policy development process. Marketing tasks mainly consist of uncovering and responding to public opinion.

*Party type 3.* When this party develops policy, it considers core party beliefs to be just as important as public opinion. On the whole, the party emphasizes policy pragmatism and balances being responsive to public opinion with following the party's core beliefs. This party actively attempts to include a broad range of societal groups in the internal policy development process, even though these groups may not necessarily agree with the party on the resulting policy. Marketing tasks mainly consist of synthesizing the diverse opinions that exist within society.

**Appendix 2**

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.56</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.02	<i>0.67</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.02	0.08	<i>0.57</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.15	0.00	0.00	<i>0.57</i>				
5. Information generation	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.14	<i>0.57</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.16	0.02	0.01	0.18	0.34	<i>0.59</i>		
7. Member participation	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.16	0.32	0.44	<i>0.59</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.18	0.29	0.35	<i>0.53</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for all members of Party A

**Table AI.**

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.54</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.02	<i>0.69</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.02	0.08	<i>0.57</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.07	0.00	0.00	<i>0.60</i>				
5. Information generation	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.14	<i>0.55</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.16	0.16	0.01	0.18	0.34	<i>0.58</i>		
7. Member participation	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.16	0.32	0.44	<i>0.54</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.18	0.29	0.35	<i>0.52</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for all members of Party B

**Table AII.**



**Table AIII.**  
Path coefficients for  
Party A and Party B

Path	Path coefficients, Party A			Path coefficients, Party B		
	Very active members (Model 1)	Moderately active members (Model 2)	Inactive members (Model 3)	Very active members (Model 1)	Moderately active members (Model 2)	Inactive members (Model 3)
CO → IG	(-0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(-0.01)
CO → ID	(-0.03)	-0.09*	(-0.06)	(-0.01)	-0.11*	(-0.06)
CO → MP	(-0.03)	0.08*	(0.02)	(-0.06)	(0.06)	(-0.00)
CO → CSI	(-0.00)	(-0.06)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(-0.02)	(-0.01)
SO → IG	0.26**	0.47**	0.34**	0.39**	0.30**	0.25**
SO → ID	0.16**	0.13*	0.22**	0.17**	0.22**	0.12**
SO → MP	0.13**	0.13**	0.15**	(0.08)	0.10**	0.13**
SO → CSI	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(-0.00)	0.11**
IO → IG	0.25**	0.19**	0.12**	0.17**	0.25**	0.14**
IO → ID	0.20**	0.20**	0.24**	0.16**	0.17**	0.15**
IO → MP	0.19**	0.13**	0.15**	0.15**	0.21**	0.24**
IO → CSI	0.18**	0.17**	0.16**	0.11*	0.17**	0.07*
VO → IG	(0.08)	(0.08)	-0.09*	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)
VO → ID	-0.13*	-0.15**	(-0.05)	-0.12**	-0.14**	-0.12**
VO → MP	(0.02)	(0.05)	(-0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.07)
VO → CSI	(0.02)	(0.06)	(-0.07)	(-0.06)	(-0.05)	(-0.07)
IG → ID	0.47**	0.54**	0.38**	0.51**	0.41**	0.39**
ID → MP	0.54**	0.63**	0.48**	0.58**	0.47**	0.44**
MP → CSI	0.50**	0.58**	0.45**	0.49**	0.47**	0.42**

**Note:** \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; insignificant path coefficients are italicised in parentheses

Construct	Model	AVE	Composite reliability	Q <sup>2</sup>	R <sup>2</sup>
Information generation	All respondents	0.57	0.80	0.09	0.17
	1 (very active respondents)	0.56	0.79	0.08	0.16
	2 (moderately active respondents)	0.61	0.82	0.19	0.31
Information dissemination	3 (inactive respondents)	0.55	0.78	0.08	0.15
	All respondents	0.59	0.85	0.26	0.45
	1	0.58	0.85	0.25	0.44
Member participation	2	0.64	0.87	0.34	0.56
	3	0.55	0.83	0.21	0.39
	All respondents	0.59	0.85	0.28	0.48
Consistent strategy implementation	1	0.60	0.86	0.30	0.49
	2	0.66	0.88	0.38	0.58
	3	0.53	0.82	0.21	0.39
Internal orientation	All respondents	0.53	0.82	0.18	0.37
	1	0.55	0.83	0.20	0.38
	2	0.56	0.83	0.25	0.47
Voter orientation	3	0.50	0.61	0.14	0.32
	All respondents	0.56	0.79	-	-
	1	0.55	0.79	-	-
Competitor orientation	2	0.59	0.81	-	-
	3	0.53	0.77	-	-
	All respondents	0.67	0.86	-	-
Societal orientation	1	0.68	0.86	-	-
	2	0.67	0.86	-	-
	3	0.61	0.82	-	-
Information generation	All respondents	0.57	0.72	-	-
	1	0.57	0.73	-	-
	2	0.59	0.74	-	-
Information dissemination	3	0.52	0.61	-	-
	All respondents	0.57	0.73	-	-
	1	0.59	0.74	-	-
Member participation	2	0.58	0.73	-	-
	3	0.55	0.71	-	-

**Table AIV.**  
Model quality criteria for  
Party A, all respondents  
and by activity levels

**Table AV.**  
Model quality criteria for  
Party B, all respondents  
and by activity levels

Construct	Model	AVE	Composite reliability	Quality criteria	$Q^2$	$R^2$
Information generation	All respondents	0.55	0.78	0.08	0.15	
	1 (very active respondents)	0.54	0.77	0.10	0.21	
	2 (moderately active respondents)	0.54	0.78	0.10	0.19	
Information dissemination	3 (inactive respondents)	0.57	0.80	0.05	0.10	
	All respondents	0.58	0.85	0.21	0.36	
	1	0.62	0.86	0.28	0.47	
Member participation	2	0.59	0.85	0.23	0.40	
	3	0.55	0.83	0.15	0.28	
	All respondents	0.54	0.82	0.21	0.39	
Consistent strategy implementation	1	0.58	0.85	0.27	0.49	
	2	0.56	0.83	0.21	0.38	
	3	0.50	0.80	0.18	0.36	
Internal orientation	All respondents	0.52	0.81	0.13	0.28	
	1	0.53	0.82	0.15	0.32	
	2	0.55	0.83	0.17	0.31	
Voter orientation	3	0.49	0.79	0.11	0.26	
	All respondents	0.54	0.78	-	-	
	1	0.57	0.80	-	-	
Competitor orientation	2	0.55	0.78	-	-	
	3	0.53	0.77	-	-	
	All respondents	0.69	0.87	-	-	
Societal orientation	1	0.68	0.86	-	-	
	2	0.68	0.87	-	-	
	3	0.67	0.86	-	-	
Information generation	All respondents	0.57	0.72	-	-	
	1	0.52	0.69	-	-	
	2	0.62	0.76	-	-	
Information dissemination	3	0.54	0.65	-	-	
	All respondents	0.60	0.75	-	-	
	1	0.60	0.75	-	-	
Member participation	2	0.60	0.75	-	-	
	3	0.59	0.74	-	-	

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.55</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.04	<i>0.68</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.02	0.08	<i>0.57</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.06	0.00	0.01	<i>0.59</i>				
5. Information generation	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.10	<i>0.56</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.14	0.34	<i>0.58</i>		
7. Member participation	0.19	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.35	0.44	<i>0.60</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.17	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.10	0.28	0.35	<i>0.55</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party A, Group 1 (very active members)

Table AVI.

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.59</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.03	<i>0.67</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.02	0.12	<i>0.59</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.12	0.01	0.00	<i>0.58</i>				
5. Information generation	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.27	<i>0.61</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.21	0.04	0.02	0.24	0.44	<i>0.64</i>		
7. Member participation	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.23	0.37	0.53	<i>0.66</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.18	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.26	0.41	0.44	<i>0.56</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party A, Group 2 (moderately active members)

Table AVII.

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.53</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.01	<i>0.61</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.01	0.06	<i>0.52</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.05	0.00	0.00	<i>0.55</i>				
5. Information generation	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.13	<i>0.55</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.14	0.01	0.01	0.17	0.26	<i>0.55</i>		
7. Member participation	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.14	0.26	0.36	<i>0.53</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.10	0.24	0.28	<i>0.50</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party A, Group 3 (inactive members)

Table AVIII.

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.57</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.03	<i>0.68</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.02	0.05	<i>0.52</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.06	0.00	0.01	<i>0.60</i>				
5. Information generation	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.18	<i>0.54</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.12	0.02	0.01	0.18	0.38	<i>0.62</i>		
7. Member participation	0.14	0.01	0.02	0.14	0.45	0.45	<i>0.58</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.15	0.26	0.30	<i>0.53</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party B, Group 1 (very active members)

Table AIX.

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.55</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.01	<i>0.68</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.01	0.08	<i>0.62</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.04	0.00	0.01	<i>0.60</i>				
5. Information generation	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.13	<i>0.54</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.13	0.03	0.01	0.15	0.28	<i>0.59</i>		
7. Member participation	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.24	0.32	<i>0.56</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.16	0.22	0.28	<i>0.55</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party B, Group 2 (moderately active members)

Table AX.

Construct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Internal orientation	<i>0.53</i>							
2. Voter orientation	0.01	<i>0.67</i>						
3. Competitor orientation	0.00	0.06	<i>0.54</i>					
4. Societal orientation	0.06	0.00	0.02	<i>0.59</i>				
5. Information generation	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.08	<i>0.57</i>			
6. Information dissemination	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.21	<i>0.55</i>		
7. Member participation	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.18	0.28	<i>0.50</i>	
8. Consistent strategy implementation	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.12	0.18	0.24	<i>0.49</i>

**Note:** Average variance extracted (AVE; italics on diagonal) and squared construct correlations (below diagonal) for Party B, Group 3 (inactive members)

Table AXI.

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